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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
1 lie I ) tali Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code - Viin
§78-2a 3(2)0(19? >< >).
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DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
Issue 1. The pertinent statutory provisions governing the award of damages for a
stiln s bicacli .is occum t

- t ase, appeal ,il I Ulli, "HJI: li'ii ^ ," {•!• ' '

(1999). (Seti

npellant's Addendum 1).

verbatim

Issue 2.

'

"5

The pertinent statutory provisions governing the propriety of awarding
ocn

prejudgment interest appear at (Itah Code Ann §::

"~f .'•••• verbatim as

A^-A-*

Interest rates - Contracted rate - Legal i ate.
i i; The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods,
or chose in action that is the subject of their contract
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different
rate of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be
10% per annum.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in ari\ way
to affect any penalty or interest charge that by law applies to
delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made
before May 14, 1981
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT.
Defendants h a v e appealed It le trial com

:..:,

1

-

• .: -*

after a bench trial, awarding Plaintiff, Keith M. Jonsson, the sum of $46,400, plus
prejudgment interest in the amount of $13,533, and costs in the amount of $600, for a total
Judgment of $60,533 plus post judgment interest.
B.
1.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
On March 4, 1996, Plaintiff Keith Jonsson purchased from Defendants, a

generator, electrical equipment and a feed truck (R. 353, at p. 12:2-11), (Plaintiffs Exhibit
i).
2. Defendant Reed Bromley agreed with Plaintiff Keith Jonsson, that Mr. Jonsson
could leave the generator and electrical equipment at the Bromley Farm in order to allow
that Mr. Bromley's electrical power remain connected to egg processing equipment and
chicken sheds, so Bromley could sell the egg processing equipment; and also, to avoid
turning off the electrical power to a residence owned by Reed Bromley's father (R. 302 at
p. 23:22-25, p. 24:1-20).
3. In October of 1996, Defendant Reed Bromley falsely represented to Plaintiff Keith
Jonsson that the generator and switching unit had been taken to Salt Lake City to be semced
(R. 272, Memorandum Decision).
4. Defendant Reed Bromley had actually sold the generator and switching equipment
to a third party; and after Plaintiff Keith Jonsson had discovered that Defendant Reed
Bromley had sold the equipment, Reed Bromley represented to Mr. Jonsson that if Mr.
Jonsson would find out the replacement cost of the generator and switching equipment, he,
Reed Bromley would replace such equipment that he had admitted to Mr. Jonsson, he had
2

wrongfully sold(R. 353 at p. 82:15-25, at p. 83, p. 1-2, R. 353 at p. 147:23-24, R. 353 at p.
149:20-25).
5. Plaintiff Keith Jonsson determined that the replacement value of the generator and
switching equipment would be approximately Thirty-Six Thousand ($36,000) to Forty-Six
Thousand ($46,000) Dollars, and relayed this information to Defendant Bromley, who
thereafter refused to talk to Keith Jonsson (R. 353 at p. 150:5-7).
6. Defendant Reed Bromley sold the equipment he had previously sold to Plaintiff
Keith Jonsson in order to protect real property that his company owned, which subsequently
sold for 2.2 Million Dollars (R. 353 at pages 150, 151:1-21).
7. Richard Mitchell, an electrician with a degree in math and physics, who had been
engaged in the business of an electrician since 1994, and had continuously provided
maintenance services to Defendant Bromley Farms for approximately 30 years, was familiar
with the generator. He was employed by Plaintiff Keith Jonsson to disconnect and move the
generator (R. 353 at pages 19-21).
8. Richard Mitchell testified that the generator had a value of between Twenty-Three
or Twenty-Four Thousand ($23,000 through $24,000) Dollars; and that the switching
equipment had a value of Six to Eight Thousand ($6,000 through $8,000) Dollars (R. 353
at p. 28).
9. Plaintiff Keith Jonsson paid Richard Mitchell Twenty-Five Hundred ($2,500)
Dollars to disconnect and move the switching equipment (R. 353 at p. 78:3-15).
10. Jim Yates, who had been in the business of selling equipment for approximately
3

30 years, testified that the generator was worth between Twenty-Five and Thirty-Five
Thousand ($25,000 through $35,000) Dollars, based on the price of a new generator and the
hours that the subject generator had on it. (R. 353 at p. 117:16-23).
11. Mr. Yates testified that he did not know what the switching equipment was worth
(R. 353 at p. 113).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT I: The trial court made findings as to Plaintiffs damages. The trial
court utilized U.C.A. §§ 70A-2-711, 713 and 715 (1999), as the basis for its measure of
damages and made findings that Plaintiff was entitled to a return of his purchase price, (70 A2-711), the market value of the equipment (70A-2-713) and incidental damages (70A-2-715).
The trial court's findings as to the foregoing damages were supported by the evidence, and
were proper under the requirements of the applicable Uniform Commercial Code Sections.
ARGUMENT II: The trial court's findings as to the market value of the generator and
switching equipment was determined in accordance with fixed "rules of evidence and
appropriate standards of value," which entitled Plaintiff to prejudgment interest. Further, the
award of prejudgment interest in accordance with the policy considerations, which are the
basis for an award of prejudgment interest, awarded Plaintiff damages for the delay in the
money owed to him and prevented the Defendants from being benefited by failing to pay the
money that they knew was owed to Plaintiff in November of 1996.

4

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CALCULATED THE PLAINTIFF'S
DAMAGES
Appellants argue that the trial court miscalculated the damages under U C A § § 70A-2-711,

713, 715 Such is not the case U C A § 70A-2-711(1) (b) provides as follows
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiate or the buyer
rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to
any goods involved, an with respect to the whole if the breach goes to
the whole contract (Section 70A-2-612), the buyer may cancel and
whether or not he has done so may in addition to recovering so much
of the price as has been paid (emphasis added)
(b) recover damages for nondelivery as provided in this
chapter (Section 70A-2-713)
U C A § 70A-2-713(l) provides as follows
(1) Subject to the provisions of this chapter with respect to proof
of market price (Section 70A-2-723), the measure of damages for
nondelivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference between the
market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the
contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages
provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-715), but less expenses saved
in consequence of the seller's breach
U C A § 70A-2-715 (1) provides as follows
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and
care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially
reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with
effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay
or other breach
The trial court applying the above provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code stated in it's
Memorandum Decision
The Code specifically provides for compensatory remedies for
aggrieved buyers in U C A § 70A-2-711(1) "[T]he buyer may...///
5

addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid. . . (b)
recover damages for nondelivery as provided in this chapter (Section
70A-2-713)"
Utah Code Annotated § 70A-2-713 then provides for expectational
damages in the event of a seller's breach
Subject to the provisions of this chapter with respect to proof of
market price (section 70A-2-723), the measure of damages for
nondelivery or repudiated by the seller is the difference between the
market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the
contract price together with any incidental and consequential
damages provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-715), but less
expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach
Incidental damages, pursuant to U C A § 70A-2-715(l) "include
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation
and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially
reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with
effecting cover and any reasonable expense incident to the delay or
other breach"
According to the UCC, Mr Jonsson is entitled to recover (1) the
amount he paid Defendants under the contract for the goods he did
not receive, (2) the difference between the market and contract prices
for the goods, and (3) incidental damages he has incurred as a result
of his performance under the breached contract (Memorandum
Decision, R 269-270)
The trial court, according to the exact wording of the statute, awarded Plaintiff Keith Jonsson
the $5,900 that he had paid to Defendants for the purchase of the generator and switching equipment
and calculated the Judgment as follows
Accordingly, Plaintiff Keith Jonsson is entitled to a judgment
against the Defendants, Reed Bromley and Utah Valley Egg &
Poultry, Inc, jointly and severally in the amount of Forty-Six
Thousand Four Hundred ($46,400) Dollars (which is the total of
$5,900 (amount paid less value of feed truck) + $38,000 (value of
generator and switching unit) + $2,500 (sum paid to Richard
Mitchell), together with interest thereon at the legal rate of 10% per
annum from November 14, 1996 through the present, pursuant to
6

Section 15-l-(2) Utah Code Annotated ($13,533), together with
Plaintiffs costs in the amount of Six Hundred ($600) Dollars (R. 292,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 12).
Defendant's argument that the trial court made a mathematical error is simply contrary
to the trial court's calculations as set forth in the trial court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. Pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code, Plaintiff was entitled to
a return of the money that he paid to the Defendants ($5,900) + the fair market value of the
generator and switching equipment ($38,000) + his incidental damages ($2,500) for a total
of Forty-Six Thousand Four Hundred ($46,400) Dollars, to which was added the
prejudgment interest of $13,533, and Plaintiffs costs in the amount of $600 for a total
judgment of Sixty Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-Three ($60,533) Dollars.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST ON THE PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in awarding prejudgement interest because

Plaintiffs experts varied in their opinion as to the value of the generator and electrical equipment, and
the Court therefore had to make a judgment call on the damages that were not fixed at the time of
the breach An examination of the facts indicate that Defendant's position is not well-taken
Richard Mitchell, an electrician, testified that the electrical switching equipment had a value
of Six to Eight Thousand ($6,000 to $8,000) Dollars; and the trial court found that the value of the
switching equipment was Eight Thousand ($8,000) Dollars.
Additionally, Richard Mitchell opined that the value of the generator was between TwentyThree and Twenty-Four Thousand ($23,000 to $24,000) Dollars.
Jim Yates, an equipment dealer, who had been engaged in the business of selling equipment
7

for approximately 30 years, testified that the market value of the generator was between Twenty-Five
and Thirty-Five Thousand ($25,000 to $35,000) Dollars. Jim Yates gave no opinion as to the value
of the switching equipment. Based upon combined testimonies of Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Yates, the
trial court found the value of the generator to be Thirty Thousand ($30,000) Dollars, and the
switching equipment to have a value of Eight Thousand ($8,000) Dollars. It should also be noted that
Mr. Jonsson, after consulting several dealers, advised Defendants at the time of the breach that it
would cost between Thirty-Six ($36,000) and Forty-Six Thousand ($46,000) Dollars to replace the
generator and switching equipment (R. 353 at p. 150).
Prejudgment interest should be awarded when the damages can be ascertained by "fixed rules
of evidence and known standards of value, " Fell v Union Pac. Ry Co.. 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907) In
accordance with this standard and based upon a narrow range of properly presented market value
evidence, the trial court found the value of the generator and switching equipment to be Thirty-Eight
Thousand ($38,000) Dollars, and Plaintiffs consequential damages to be Twenty-Five Hundred
($2,500) Dollars, and applying U.C.A. §§ 70A-2-711, 713, awarded a total judgment of Forty-Six
Thousand Four Hundred ($46,400) Dollars, plus prejudgment interest from November 1996, through
the date ofjudgment ($13,533). It is critical to note at trial, Defendants did not put on any testimony
as to the value of the generator and switching equipment; and therefore failed to present any evidence
requiring the trial court to exercise its discretion, as between the parties, in determining damages
Apparently, Defendants were content to have Mr Yates testify as to value because as Mr Yates
testified, he was "friends" with both parties which made it difficult for him to testify (R. 353 at p
122:14-25).
Defendants argue that it is appropriate to deny prejudgment interest if the amount of the
8

damages are not known at the time of the breach, because the breaching party cannot tender the
amount the amount owed. That is not the situation in this case. The trail court found that Defendant
Reed Bromley had wrongfully sold the generator and switching equipment to a third party having
previously misrepresented to Plaintiff Keith Jonsson, that the equipment purchased by Plaintiff was
being serviced in Salt Lake City (R. 272, Memorandum Decision). Upon Defendant Reed Bromley
admitting that he had wrongfully sold the equipment, he told Plaintiff Keith Jonsson to find a
comparable generator, and that he would replace the generator and switching equipment that he had
wrongfully sold. Based upon this representation, Mr. Jonsson verified with several dealers, that the
generator and switching equipment had a value of between Thirty-Six Thousand ($36,000) and
Forty-Six Thousand ($46,000) Dollars, which information, Mr. Jonsson relayed to Mr. Bromley
Accordingly, contrary to Defendant's position, that he did not know how much to tender to Plaintiff
Keith Jonsson, the evidence is clear that in November of 1996, Defendant was very much aware of
the fact that the damages were approximately Forty-Six Thousand ($46,000) Dollars, which is very
close to the principal judgment of $46,400 that the trial court awarded Plaintiff.
In footnote 2 of Appellant's Brief (quoting from Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co.. 939 P 2d 1204
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), Appellant states:
This Court will add prejudgment interest to a trial court's judgment
only when the market value of the loss is clearly determined by the
testimony of an expert witness, not the discretionary judgment of the
trial judge. Castillo. 939 P. 2d at 1206. The decision in Castillo
furthers the policy of compensating the injured party for a delay in
payment that could be measured by facts and figures before trial. The
decision lies in contrast to the case at hand, where the trial judge
chose to weigh the opinions of others and then apply his own best
judgment in determining the market value of the loss. Thus, Mr.
Bromley could not have known before trial what amount he owed
after his breach, and should not be punished for not paying when the
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amount was not ascertainable or calculable (Appellant's Brief, Page
12)
Defendant's assertion as set forth above, that he did not know the amount of the damages is
contrary to the evidence which establishes that Defendant Reed Bromley knew the amount of the
damages as early as November 1996
This Court in Castillo v Atlanta Cas Co . 939 P 2d 1204 at 1212 (Utah App 1997),
referenced above, stated
In Utah, prejudgment interest "represents an amount awarded as
damages due to the opposing party's delay in tendering the amount
owing under an obligation " L &A Drywall, Inc .v. Whitmore Constr.
Co., 608 P2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980) Accord Hermes Assocs. v.
Park's Sportsman, 813 P 2d 1221, 1224 (Utah Ct App 1991), Vase Is
v. LoGiudice, 740 P 2d 1375, 1378 (Utah Ct App 1987), 22
Am Jur 2d Damages § 82 (1988) See also Trail Mountain Coal Co.
v. UtahDiv. of State Lands & Forestry, 921 P 2d 1365, 1370 (Utah
1996) (stating that, as matter of public policy, prejudgment interest
compensates party for depreciating value of amount owed and deters
intentional withholding of money owed), cert, denied, — U S
,
117 S Ct 1017, 136 L Ed 2d 894 (1997) It may be awarded where
"damage is complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures,
and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time " Andreason v.
Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 848 P 2d 171, 177 (Utah Ct App 1993)
In November of 1996, Defendant Reed Bromley knew that Plaintiff Keith Jonsson's damages
were between Thirty-Six ($36,000) and Forty-Six ($46,000) Thousand Dollars, after Mr Jonsson had
determined the value of the generator and switching equipment that Mr Bromley had agreed to
replace
Defendant Bromley chose to breach the contract and wrongfully sell equipment previously
sold to Plaintiff Jonsson in order farther Defendant Bromley's own economic interests Mr Bromley
needed the money that he received from selling the equipment to a third party to preserve an asset
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that was subsequently sold for 2.2 Million Dollars. In accordance with the policy set forth in Castillo.
"as a matter of public policy, prejudgment interest compensates party for depreciating value of
amount owed and deters intentional withholding of money owed" (Castillo at page 1212).
The narrow range of testimony from which the trial court determined the value of the
generator and electrical equipment was very close to what Plaintiff Keith Jonsson had advised
Defendant Reed Bromley were his damages, as early as November 1996, both of which values were
based on market values.
Under the facts of this case, Defendants should not be rewarded for intentionally withholding
money from Plaintiff and Plaintiff should not be further damaged for the depreciating amount owed
him, because Plaintiffs experts testified to a slight variation in market value.
Accordingly, the trial court under the facts of this case and in accordance with the policy
considerations set forth in Castillo, properly awarded Plaintiff Keith Jonsson prejudgment interest to
compensate him for the depreciating value of the amount owed, and avoided benefiting Defendants
for "intentionally withholding of money owed."
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly applied its findings in accordance with U.C.A. §§ 70A-2-711
through 715, in determining Plaintiffs damages.
The trial court correctly awarded prejudgment interest under the facts of this case, and
the Judgment in the amount of Sixty Thousand, Five Hundred, Thirty-Three ($60,533)
Dollars, should be affirmed.
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DATED this

/

/

day of October, 2000.
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN

MARK C. MCLACHLAN
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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